内生性
公司治理
司法独立
激励
政治
业务
会计
质量(理念)
干预(咨询)
独立性(概率论)
经济
公共经济学
法学
市场经济
财务
政治学
统计
认识论
精神科
哲学
数学
计量经济学
心理学
作者
Shaojie Lai,Laifeng Yang,Qing Wang,Hamish D. Anderson
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102424
摘要
This study explores the effects of judicial independence on corporate innovation by analyzing the staggered establishment of Circuit Courts in China. We find that introducing Circuit Courts increases corporate innovation, particularly for central state-owned enterprises and private firms. Channel analysis shows that Circuit Courts significantly reduce local judicial protectionism, ease financial constraints, and improve corporate governance, which stimulates innovation. The positive effects of Circuit Courts are more pronounced in cities facing severe political intervention, regions with weak legal environments, and private firms without political or banking connections. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns, alternative measures and specification models. Overall, this study supports the theoretical arguments that institutions matter and that improvements in judicial quality boost firms' incentives to innovate.
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