Rotating Dual Antennas Based Detection Method For Distributed GNSS Spoofing Attacks

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing is one of the most dangerous attacks, with the purpose of inducing false information and maliciously manipulating the positioning and timing results of GNSS applications. To protect the safety of the GNSS, a lot of anti-spoofing methods have been well-researched. Most of them are based on the single-antenna assumption, where multiple spoofing signals are transmitted from the same spoofing antenna. However, these methods would fail when confronted with distributed spoofing attacks. This type of spoofing attack simulates a scenario where authentic signals are coming from satellites in different directions by utilizing multiple transmitting antennas, more covert and more threatening. The calibrated antenna array can be utilized to cope with such threats. It compares whether the signal direction estimated by the antenna array and the expected signal direction obtained from the ephemeris message is consistent to detect spoofing signals. However, utilizing an antenna array is of high complexity both in the aspects of hardware and software. Besides, the antenna array needs to be calibrated in advance to compensate relative phase and gain of the antenna elements, which is inconvenient in practical use. The idea presented in this paper intends to overcome such limitations, based on the rotating dual antennas. Our method is able to detect spoofing attacks both utilizing single or multiple antennas. Furthermore, compared with the methods with the calibrated antenna array, the number of antenna elements is reduced by utilizing the rotating characteristics of antennas and no calibration process should be conducted. The performance analysis is supported by several simulation tests and field experiments, to prove the effectiveness of the proposed method.