Recent research on concurrent sourcing has identified the preconditions for the simultaneous use of multiple sourcing modes (i.e. make-and-buy). However, little progress has been made to address this question: in the presence of such preconditions, how do firms decide how much to make and how much to buy? Our paper fills this gap by identifying two mechanisms that explain the make-buy balance in concurrent sourcing. First, opportunities for resource co-specialization within the firm enhance the benefits of internalization (i.e. make). Second, the supplier portfolio design affects the make-buy balance. In particular, a firm using a small number of suppliers benefits from relational contracting and consequently relies more on externalization (i.e. buy). Using a panel dataset of in-house lawyers at Fortune 500 firms, we demonstrate that concurrent sourcing strategies are tilted in favor of ‘make’ when firms have resources for co- specialization in the form of R&D, advertising, international presence, and legal expertise in their top management team. We also find that firms rely more on ‘make’ when they have a large number of suppliers of legal services. This paper contributes to theories of the firm by identifying reasons for variation in concurrent sourcing strategies, and by extending the enquiry to the domain of corporate functions.