贴现
经济
提交
碳排放税
时间偏好
马尔可夫完全平衡
常量(计算机编程)
偏爱
微观经济学
动态不一致
社会规划师
数理经济学
规划师
纳什均衡
气候变化
计算机科学
生物
数据库
程序设计语言
生态学
财务
作者
Terrence Iverson,Larry S. Karp
标识
DOI:10.1093/restud/rdaa048
摘要
Abstract We study the Markov perfect equilibrium in a dynamic game where agents have non-constant time preference, decentralized households determine aggregate savings, and a planner chooses climate policy. The article is the first to solve this problem with general discounting and general functional forms. With time-inconsistent preferences, a commitment device that allows a planner to choose climate policy for multiple periods is potentially very valuable. Nevertheless, our quantitative results show that while a permanent commitment device would be very valuable, the ability to commit policy for “only” 100 years adds less than 2% to the value of climate policy without commitment. We solve a log-linear version of the model analytically, generating a formula for the optimal carbon tax that includes the formula in Golosov et al. (2014, Econometrica, 82, 41–88) as a special case. More importantly, we develop new algorithms to solve the general game numerically. Convex damages lead to strategic interactions across generations of planners that lower the optimal carbon tax by 45% relative to the scenario without strategic interactions.
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