执行
采购
利用
组织犯罪
竞赛(生物学)
业务
执法
经济
犯罪学
营销
政治学
法学
计算机安全
生态学
社会学
计算机科学
生物
作者
Pablo Slutzky,Stefan Zeume
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2023-11-10
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2021.00859
摘要
We exploit staggered municipality-level antimafia enforcement actions in Italy over the 1995–2015 period to study how the presence of organized crime affects firms. Following enforcement actions, we find increases in competition (i) among firms and (ii) for public procurement contracts. Firms that do not exit after a weakening of organized crime shrink in size, more so when operating in the nontradable sector. Our findings are consistent with organized crime acting as a barrier to entry and affecting local economic activity. This paper was accepted by David Sraer, finance. Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.00859 .
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