股东
业务
会计
估价(财务)
盈利能力指数
控制(管理)
公司治理
财务
经济
管理
摘要
This research examines whether family control of afirm increases profitability in areas where laws protect the interests ofminority shareholders.Data were collected in 2002-2003 from 1,672non-financial firms in thirteen Western European countries.Resultsindicate that family-controlled firms experience a 7 percent greater firmvaluation than firms with non-family controlling shareholders. In firms where family members are active (i.e., a family member holds one ofthe top two officer seats), accounting profits are significantly higher thanthose where family members are passive shareholders.Firm valuation doesnot appear to be affected by a family's active control. The classical agency issue between owners and managers is lowered infamily-owned firms.In the Western European countries considered, themarkets appear to be well-regulated.Consequently, minority shareholdersare not harmed by the family's control of the firm.Conversely, theresults imply that family firms in well-regulated markets tend to benefit theminority shareholders through increased firm valuation. (SRD)
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