计算机科学
排队
班级(哲学)
信息共享
马尔可夫链
二进制数
马尔可夫过程
用户信息
零(语言学)
占用率
信息系统
连接(拓扑)
个人可识别信息
信息敏感性
信息过滤系统
互联网隐私
排队论
激励
信息不对称
推荐系统
计算机网络
方案(数学)
全面披露
作者
Siddharth Prakash Singh,Mohammad Delasay,Mehmet Berat Aydemir,Mustafa Akan
标识
DOI:10.1287/msom.2025.0482
摘要
Problem definition: We study delay information disclosure policies for on-demand platforms serving two user classes (customers and providers) who seek matches using the platform. The platform’s objective is to maximize the match rate by choosing the level of information—no information, binary information (indicating whether the wait is zero or nonzero), or occupancy information (indicating the expected delay based on the number of users currently in the system)—to disclose to each user class. Users of each class decide whether to join or balk based on the delay information disclosed to them. Methodology/results: We consider two user types in each class: patient users who are willing to wait for a match and impatient users who are not. We use continuous-time Markov chains to model the system as two-sided queues and employ equilibrium analysis to characterize users’ joining behavior and the platform’s match rate under each disclosure policy. We show that the two-sided system decouples and that disclosure decisions can be analyzed as two one-sided systems only if some level of information (binary or occupancy) is disclosed to both user classes. We find that disclosing binary information dominates disclosing no information or occupancy information to a user class when its patient users are sufficiently patient, whereas disclosing occupancy information dominates disclosing binary information to a user class when there are enough patient users. Numerical experiments show that disclosing occupancy information to both user classes is typically not suboptimal by much. We find that compared with the platform’s optimal disclosure choice, a user class may prefer more or less granular information for themselves or the other class. This utility analysis does not lend itself to decoupling. Managerial implications: Our findings hold crucial implications for platform managers; carefully evaluating the chosen information-sharing strategy is imperative, and guidelines from the one-sided literature are generally inadequate for making disclosure decisions. Funding: S. P. Singh acknowledges support from the University College London School of Management [Grant 100032871], M. Delasay acknowledges support from Stony Brook University [Trustees Faculty Award], and M. Akan acknowledges support the National Science Foundation [CAREER Award 1351821]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2025.0482 .
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