市场流动性
道德风险
流动性危机
银行监管
金融体系
业务
会计流动性
金融监管
宏观审慎监管
经济
金融危机
首都(建筑)
流动性风险
财务
系统性风险
激励
市场经济
宏观经济学
历史
考古
作者
George Kladakis,Lei Chen,Sotirios K. Bellos
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2022.102629
摘要
The exposures of the banking system during the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 alerted regulators who strengthened their regulation and supervision of banks to prevent future problems. Yet, banks need to perform one of their main functions in the economy, which is creating liquidity. This raises the question: does greater regulation and supervision of banks enhance or impede bank liquidity creation? We use the 2019 Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey published by the World Bank to update the respective indexes and examine the relationship between regulation, supervision and liquidity creation. We find that banks create more liquidity in countries with stronger supervision policies such as supervisory power and mitigation of moral hazard, while they create less liquidity in countries with tighter regulatory regimes such as activity restrictions and capital regulations.
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