提交
激励
预警系统
预警系统
安静的
业务
债务
财务
坏账
精算学
经济
微观经济学
计算机科学
量子力学
电信
数据库
物理
作者
Volker Laux,Ronghuo Zheng
出处
期刊:The Accounting Review
[American Accounting Association]
日期:2023-07-01
卷期号:98 (4): 273-288
被引量:4
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2019-0493
摘要
ABSTRACT We study the optimal information system in a debt contracting setting in which managers can engage in value destroying risk-shifting behavior. The information system issues early-warning signals that allow lenders to take corrective actions such as liquidating unprofitable projects. When managers are empire builders, the optimal system exhibits a conservative bias that leads to excessive early-warning signals and excessive project liquidations relative to first best. In contrast, when managers have a strong preference for a quiet life, the optimal system exhibits a liberal bias that leads to insufficient early-warning signals and excessive project continuations. The broad intuition is that excessive liquidations (continuations) impose costs on managers who have a preference for empire building (a quiet life), and these costs are more severe when managers take excessive risks. The bias in the information system therefore permits managers to commit not to engage in risk shifting and facilitates debt financing. JEL Classifications: G30; G32; M40; M41.
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