The integrated interaction of channel selection of supplier and information-sharing decision of hybrid platform in two-stage game process

Purpose The hybrid platform is emerging into online retailing market based on third-party operated and platform self-operated channels, forming the dual-channel model. At the same time, information asymmetry affects bilateral users’ channel selection strategies, ultimately leading to competitive imbalances between channels. To achieve structural matching between different channels, this study studies the pricing strategies of suppliers as well as platform under four information-sharing situations. Design/methodology/approach This paper constructs a hybrid platform composed with third-party operated and platform self-operated channels, considering the yes/no sharing supply information to consumers under a two-stage game process. Four scenarios are constructed: {information not-sharing, third-party channel}, {information not-sharing, platform self-operated channel}, {information sharing, third-party channel} and {information sharing, platform self-operated channel}. Findings There are several interesting conclusions: the retail price in self-operated channel is always higher than the third-party channel. Under the two-stage pricing scenario, the equilibrium strategies are that platforms do not share information, and the supplier selects the platform self-operated channel. However, under unified pricing scenario, if inter-channel competition is higher, platform is better to share information; but if the information-sharing degree is higher, shifting into not sharing information is better for the platform. Originality/value First, we focus on the hybrid channel to optimal pricing decisions among different channels under different information sharing strategies, enriching the related literature studies about the information asymmetry of multi-channel platform. Second, our study provides the theoretical framework for platform to coordinate multiple channels by illuminating the influence logistic of transaction fees and information-sharing degree on information-sharing methods. Third, this study applies the two-stage pricing model to indicate the dynamic game progress of pre- and post-information sharing, enriching the applications of multiple-stage model and providing suggestions for staged pricing and unified pricing.