担保
再制造
斯塔克伯格竞赛
补贴
供应链
消费(社会学)
盈利能力指数
微观经济学
业务
经济盈余
经济
产业组织
环境经济学
福利
营销
财务
社会科学
生物
市场经济
社会学
生态学
法学
政治学
作者
Jinhong Li,Shuguang He,Min Zhang
摘要
Abstract Both warranty services and subsidy policies are effective strategies for promoting the development of remanufacturing. According to the warranty provider, this paper considers two possible warranty strategies: the manufacturer warranty and the retailer warranty. The optimal pricing and warranty periods are determined by considering the effect of the consumption subsidy policy through Stackelberg game models. Subsequently, this paper investigates the optimal warranty strategy by comparing the economic and integrated performance of the closed‐loop supply chain. The analytical results indicate that the retailer warranty enables the supply chain to obtain a higher economic performance than the manufacturer warranty. Nevertheless, the integrated performance that combines economic and environmental performance depends on the consumption subsidy level. In addition, this paper finds that the consumption subsidy policy enhances supply chain profitability and consumer surplus but may hurt the environment in certain scenarios. Therefore, this paper derives the optimal subsidy level by maximizing the total social welfare, which takes into account both economic and environmental performance. These findings provide valuable insights for policymakers in remanufacturing.
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