Elites, the aid curse, and Chinese development finance: A conjoint survey experiment on elites’ aid preferences in 141 low‐ and middle‐income countries

Abstract Why do elites in low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs) favor some foreign aid projects and partners over others? Research on the “aid curse” and Chinese development finance suggests elites should prefer aid that can be easily captured, with few conditionalities, regulations, or transparency requirements. We administer a conjoint survey experiment across 141 LMICs to elicit the aid preferences of elites who are uniquely close to development policy debates. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we find that elites favor larger over smaller projects, grants over loans, and transportation infrastructure projects over initiatives focused on civil society or tax collection capacity. But contrary to the aid curse theory, elites also prefer projects with transparent terms and labor, corruption, and environmental regulations, and are at worst indifferent towards good governance conditionalities. These preferences hold even in corrupt and autocratic countries and even among high‐level government officials who might be expected to favor “no‐strings‐attached” aid regimes.