债务抵押债务
业务
二级抵押贷款市场
债券
债券信用评级
债务
结构性融资
债券市场
义务
经济
贷款
发行人
金融体系
精算学
信用风险
证券化
货币经济学
商业抵押担保证券
信用评级
违约
抵押品
财务
按揭保险
金融危机
法学
资信证明
宏观经济学
保险单
意外伤害保险
政治学
作者
Joseph R. Mason,Joshua Rosner
摘要
Many of the current difficulties in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) can be attributed to a misapplication of agency ratings. Changes in mortgage origination and servicing make it difficult to evaluate the risk of RMBS and CDOs. We show that the big three ratings agencies are often confronted with an array of conflicting incentives, which can affect choices in subjective measurements of risk. Of even greater concern, however, is the fact that the process of creating RMBS and CDOs requires the ratings agencies to arguably become part of the underwriting team, leading to legal risks and even more conflicts. We analyze the fundamental differences between rating structured finance products like RMBS and CDOs and traditional products like corporate debt. We show that the inefficiencies of rating RMBS and CDOs are leading investors to discount U.S. markets. We conclude by providing several policy implications of our findings.
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