甲骨文公司
计算机科学
特洛伊木马
嵌入式系统
硬件特洛伊木马
寄存器传输电平
铸造厂
逻辑综合
逻辑门
计算机安全
程序设计语言
工程类
算法
机械工程
作者
Nimisha Limaye,Animesh Chowdhury,Christian Pilato,Mohammed Nabeel,Ozgur Sinanoglu,Siddharth Garg,Ramesh Karri
出处
期刊:Design Automation Conference
日期:2021-12-05
被引量:6
标识
DOI:10.1109/dac18074.2021.9586314
摘要
Logic locking protects integrated circuits (IC) against intellectual property (IP) theft, IC overbuilding, and hardware Trojan insertion. Prior locking schemes operate after logic synthesis and cannot protect the semantic information embedded into the logic. Register-transfer level (RTL) locking can protect the sensitive IP semantics and are EDA tool-chain agnostic, allowing seamless integration into arbitrary design flows. State-of-the-art RTL locking protects against the untrusted foundry assuming no access to working chip (oracle). However, it does not protect against oracle-based attacks. In this work, we propose to fortify RTL locking to protect against all untrusted entities in the supply chain, including foundry for oracle-less attacks, and test facility and end users for oracle-guided attacks.
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