可追溯性
供应链
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业务
产业组织
微观经济学
议价能力
功率(物理)
经济
供应链管理
博弈论
商业
讨价还价问题
纳什均衡
环境经济学
市场支配力
供求关系
产品(数学)
成本分摊
持续性
可持续增长率
牛鞭效应
作者
Lin, Yang,Lin, Huiting,Wang, Yingming
出处
期刊:
[Figshare (United Kingdom)]
日期:2025-01-01
标识
DOI:10.6084/m9.figshare.30518116
摘要
This study examines decision-making in closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) for power batteries with blockchain-enabled traceability. A bidirectional game-theoretic model in which one traceability level links the forward (sales) and reverse (recovery) sides. The manufacturer leads in a game; the retailer sets price and collection; contract terms are chosen by Nash bargaining. We analyse two implementable mechanisms: R&D cost sharing and sales revenue sharing. The findings show that blockchain supports modest price pass through while increasing market demand and consumer surplus. When traceability costs are high, R&D cost-sharing and sales revenue sharing improve coordination. Bargaining power matters: greater manufacturer power raises feasible shares, while the optimal cost- and revenue-sharing rates decline as price sensitivity and traceability costs rise. These insights provide practical guidance for deploying blockchain in battery CLSCs and support the sustainable growth of the EV industry.
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