业务
执行
公司所得税
会计
产业组织
财务
避税
双重征税
政治学
法学
作者
John Gallemore,Martin Jacob
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2023-0011
摘要
ABSTRACT We examine the consequences of corporate tax enforcement for business activity. Using two different empirical approaches—a regional design and a firm-level design—we document that corporate tax enforcement is negatively associated with business activity, as measured by establishments and employment. This association is economically significant and is robust to tests that mitigate concerns regarding endogeneity and measurement. Furthermore, we find that the negative association between tax enforcement and business activity varies substantially in the cross-section. Specifically, we find that it is weaker for regions and firms with greater access to external financing sources and is stronger for regions and firms where compliance costs are likely higher and for which the ex ante costs of tax enforcement are greater. Our findings suggest that the effects of tax enforcement on business activity are economically important and heterogeneous, which should be of interest to academics and policymakers. JEL Classifications: H25; H26; R11; R12.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI