债务
衡平法
货币经济学
业务
财务
金融市场
现金流
代理成本
金融体系
经济
股东
公司治理
政治学
法学
作者
Jonathan Davis,Naveen Gondhi
摘要
Abstract Financial markets reveal information that firm managers can utilize when making equity value-enhancing investment decisions. However, for firms with risky debt, such investments are not necessarily socially efficient. Despite this friction, we show that learning from prices improves investment efficiency. This effect is asymmetric, however, as investors learn less about projects that decrease the riskiness of cash flows: efficiency is lower for diversifying investments than for focusing (risk-increasing) investments. This also implies that investors’ endogenous learning further attenuates risk shifting but amplifies debt overhang. Our model provides a novel channel through which learning from financial markets affects agency frictions between stakeholders.
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