独创性
结构方程建模
控制(管理)
资源依赖理论
任务(项目管理)
服务(商务)
公司治理
资源(消歧)
业务
测量数据收集
营销
价值(数学)
委托代理问题
心理学
社会心理学
管理
经济
计算机科学
财务
机器学习
统计
数学
计算机网络
创造力
作者
Robin Deman,Ann Jorissen,Eddy Laveren
出处
期刊:Management Decision
[Emerald Publishing Limited]
日期:2018-01-31
卷期号:56 (2): 295-310
被引量:22
标识
DOI:10.1108/md-09-2016-0665
摘要
Purpose Although the majority of research explores the direct relationship between family control and innovativeness, the purpose of this paper is to investigate mediators that explain how family control is related to innovativeness. Grounded in agency theory, resource dependence theory, and the resource-based view of the firm, the authors suggest that this relationship operates through board task performance, that is, the level of directors’ involvement in control and service tasks. Design/methodology/approach To test the hypotheses, structural equation modeling is applied to cross-sectional survey data collected from 329 private firms that are located in Belgium. Family control is defined as 50 percent family ownership in combination with at least one family member being involved in the management or board of directors of the firm. Findings Four key results emerge from the analysis. First, family control is negatively associated with control task performance but does not affect service task performance. Second, control and service task performance positively influence innovativeness. Third, the negative relationship between family control and innovativeness is partially mediated by control task performance. Fourth, the presence of a family CEO and the percentage of family directors address heterogeneity among family controlled firms (FCFs). Originality/value This paper complements and extends existing research on the relationship between family control and innovativeness by adopting a governance perspective. The authors contribute to a deeper understanding of why FCFs are more or less innovative than nonfamily controlled firms and reveal underlying mechanisms previously uncovered.
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