委托权限
主要授权机构
声誉
控制(管理)
校长(计算机安全)
权限控制
授权
业务
组织结构
形式化描述
微观经济学
传统权威
计算机科学
经济
公共行政
计算机安全
法学
政治学
管理
程序设计语言
法律研究
作者
Philippe Aghion,Jean Tirole
摘要
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions) within organizations, and it illustrates how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. After spelling out (some of) the main determinants of the delegation of formal authority within organizations, the paper examines a number of factors that increase the subordinates' real authority in a formally integrated structure: overload, lenient rules, urgency of decision, reputation, performance measurement, and multiplicity of superiors. Finally, the amount of communication in an organization is shown to depend on the allocation of formal authority.
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