微观经济学
利润(经济学)
经济
客户群
质量(理念)
价格歧视
互补性商品
有限理性
信息不对称
财务
认识论
哲学
作者
Jeffrey D. Shulman,Xianjun Geng
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2012-09-12
卷期号:59 (4): 899-917
被引量:119
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1603
摘要
This paper uses an analytical model to examine the consequences of add-on pricing when firms are both horizontally and vertically differentiated and there is a segment of boundedly rational consumers who are unaware of the add-on fees at the time of initial purchase. We find that consumers who know the add-on fees can be penalized—and increasingly so—by the existence of boundedly rational consumers. Our consideration of quality asymmetries on base goods and add-ons, plus the inclusion of boundedly rational consumers, leads to several novel findings regarding firm profits. When quality asymmetry is on base goods only and with boundedly rational consumers, add-on pricing can diminish profit for a qualitatively superior firm and increase profit for an inferior firm (i.e., a lose–win result), compared to when add-on pricing is prohibited or infeasible. When quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add-ons and without boundedly rational consumers, the opposite win–lose result prevails. When quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add-ons and with boundedly rational consumers, the result can be win–win, win–lose, or lose–win, depending on the magnitude of quality differentiation on add-ons. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.
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