中国
公司治理
业务
会计
国家(计算机科学)
国有
实证研究
财务
经济
市场经济
政治学
算法
计算机科学
认识论
哲学
法学
作者
Lauren Yu-Hsin Lin,Yun‐chien Chang
出处
期刊:Social Science Research Network
[Social Science Electronic Publishing]
日期:2019-01-01
被引量:1
摘要
Prior literature on corporate governance in China asserts that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inefficiently run and badly governed—they are either worse than privately owned enterprises (POEs) or as bad. There is, however, no solid empirical evidence that underpins either claim. Using a unique, hand-coded data set on corporate charter provisions in a random sample of nearly 300 publicly listed Chinese firms, we develop an additive corporate governance index. The index shows that the corporate governance of SOEs firmly controlled by the Chinese central government is more in favor of minority shareholders, whereas that of SOEs firmly controlled by provincial governments appears to be less protective of minority shareholders. Overall, SOEs, particularly those controlled by the central government, do not have worse firm performance than POEs, as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Nonetheless, firms that are more politically compliant have worse firm performance. This paper demonstrates the nuanced differences among SOEs and their performance vis-a-vis POEs.
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