官僚主义
投资(军事)
中国
晋升(国际象棋)
业务
传输(计算)
经济
货币经济学
市场经济
政治学
法学
并行计算
政治
计算机科学
作者
Xiangyu Shi,Tianyang Xi,Xiaobo Zhang,Yifan Zhang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102717
摘要
This paper studies the pattern of interregional investment after bureaucratic transfers across Chinese cities. Using the administrative records of business registration, we find that the transfer of a local leader between prefecture cities is associated with about 3% increase in interregional investment along the direction of transfer. The comoving firms purchase larger parcels of land and at lower prices. They also exhibit a higher likelihood of exiting when the patrons leave the office. Comoving interregional investment does not increase the probability of promotion for transferred leaders, and yet expose them to a higher risk of anticorruption prosecution. The findings highlight the importance of personal connection between firms and bureaucrats in shaping the pattern of interregional investment.
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