权力下放
中国
代理(哲学)
政府(语言学)
业务
中央政府
国家(计算机科学)
产业组织
钥匙(锁)
经济体制
国家所有制
地方政府
市场经济
经济
公共行政
政治学
计算机科学
哲学
语言学
计算机安全
算法
法学
认识论
作者
Zhangkai Huang,Lixing Li,Guangrong Ma,Lixin Colin Xu
摘要
Hayek (1945) argues that local information is key to understanding the efficiency of alternative economic systems and whether production should be centralized or decentralized. The Chinese experience of decentralizing SOEs confirms this insight: when the distance to the government is farther, the SOE is more likely to be decentralized, and this distance-decentralization link is more pronounced with higher communication costs and greater firm-performance heterogeneity. However, when the Chinese central government oversees SOEs in strategic industries, the distance-decentralization link is muted. We also consider alternative agency-cost-based explanations, and do not find much support. (JEL D22, D83, L25, L32, L33, O14, P31)
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