回归不连续设计
杠杆(统计)
中国
原告
经济正义
政治
嵌入性
政治学
司法改革
法律与经济学
经济
政治经济学
法学
责任
多元化(营销策略)
程序正义
法治
司法独立
可能性
公共行政
业务
实质性权利
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2026.106331
摘要
Drawing on over 360,000 Chinese court records, we employ a regression discontinuity in time (RDiT) design to examine a top-down reform intended to prevent local governments from pressuring courts to decline administrative litigation cases upon submission. We find that while the total number of cases spiked briefly following the reform, increases in the volume of sensitive land-related disputes have remained stable. Meanwhile, although cases are increasingly dismissed without a formal judgment, plaintiffs who reach trial are significantly more likely to win. Combining quantitative results with qualitative evidence, we argue that Chinese local courts strategically utilize top-down mandates to pursue a subnational separation of powers. Such campaign-style reforms can produce lasting change by allowing the judiciary to gain leverage over the executive branch. While citizens' access to justice remains subject to selective gatekeeping, the continued practice of conditional justice suggests a reduced political embeddedness of local courts.
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