股东
业务
佣金
中国
库存(枪支)
货币经济学
代理(哲学)
会计
调节器
金融体系
财务
公司治理
经济
法学
基因
认识论
机械工程
工程类
哲学
化学
生物化学
政治学
作者
Xin Wang,Jiacai Xiong,Caiyue Ouyang,Feida Zhang
出处
期刊:Abacus
[Wiley]
日期:2022-11-06
卷期号:59 (1): 437-465
被引量:35
摘要
We examine the effect of a regulator‐led advocate for minority shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance in China. In recent years, the China Securities Regulatory Commission established the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), which began its ownership of 100 shares of public firms in 2016. The CSISC advocates for the interests of minority shareholders proactively. Focusing on abnormal stock returns in M&A announcements, we find that acquirers that have the CSISC as a shareholder (CSISC acquirers) exhibit higher positive abnormal stock returns than non‐CSISC acquirers. Cross‐sectional analysis suggests that the core results are mainly driven by firms with severe agency problems and weak external/internal monitoring, and those not controlled by the state. In addition, we find that CSISC acquirers have better long‐term performance and encounter more M&A failures than non‐CSISC acquirers. Our findings indicate that although the CSISC only holds 100 shares of listed companies, it plays an effective role in monitoring and driving firms to make appropriate M&A decisions.
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