Popular Song and Ethics: Ethical Perspectives and Personal Qualities

Abstract Jerrold Levinson has elegantly defended a proposal for the ethical evaluation of popular songs, which looks at the ‘personal qualities’ a song exhibits. I claim that the personal-qualities theory of artistic expression importantly contributes to explaining how songs get to have their meanings, yet that it does not very profitably extend to their ethical evaluation. I propose that the notion of a work’s ethical perspective best generates a central way of ethically evaluating popular songs, by properly linking the ethical evaluation of songs to their meanings. Reference to songs’ ethical perspectives proves able to (a) enjoy broad scope; (b) produce charitable ethical assessments; (c) generate fine-grained and comparative attributions of ethical value; and (d) deal, better than the personal-qualities view, with songs that include multiple characters, manifest despicable personae without explicitly condemning them, or exhibit a persona that eschews ethical evaluation. Investigating the theoretical centrality of this type of ethical judgment also provides us with an opportunity to better understand what construing the meaning of songs—and more generally works of art—involves: when relevant, the proper construal of works’ ethical perspectives’ objects, and of the perspectives themselves as often presenting us with outlooks just for our consideration, not approval. I close by suggesting a possible relationship between our song preferences and our sense of self, via David Hume’s notion of pride: the songs we favour help us with self-perception and -assessment, and perhaps with self-construction.