制裁
俱乐部
气候变化
气候政策
京都议定书
经济
减缓气候变化
搭便车
气候金融
自然资源经济学
公共经济学
政治学
发展中国家
经济增长
微观经济学
解剖
法学
生物
医学
激励
生态学
摘要
Notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic understanding of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge international agreements because of free-riding, as seen in the defunct Kyoto Protocol. This study examines the club as a model for international climate policy. Based on economic theory and empirical modeling, it finds that without sanctions against non-participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement. By contrast, a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants, a Climate Club, can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement. (JEL Q54, Q58, K32, K33)
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI