情感(语言学)
自保
健康保险
病人保护和负担得起的护理法
团体保险
业务
一般保险
保险单
收入保障保险
质量(理念)
关键人员保险
精算学
意外伤害保险
劳动经济学
健康福利
医疗保险
汽车保险风险选择
医疗保健
人口经济学
营业中断保险
卫生政策
财务
作者
Heitor Almeida,Ruidi Huang,Ping Liu,Yuhai Xuan
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2025-10-30
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2023.03761
摘要
This article discusses how mandating employers to provide health insurance of a minimum quality and the associated increases in health insurance premia affect firm employment and performance. Using firm-level employee health insurance data around the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), we show that the PPACA is associated with a significant increase in health insurance premia for employees in company-sponsored health insurance plans. In response, employers with greater exposure to the PPACA reduce employee enrollments in their health insurance plans to a larger extent after the law’s enactment. Our analysis suggests that employers achieve this reduction in enrollment by shifting employment composition from full-time employees to part-time, temporary, or seasonal workers, who are not covered in employer-sponsored health insurance plans. Furthermore, we find no evidence of deterioration in performance at companies more exposed to the increase in health insurance premia. Overall, our findings illustrate how firms adapt to and mitigate cost increases associated with regulatory changes through strategic labor practices. This paper was accepted by Lin William Cong, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03761 .
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