绿色洗涤
业务
股东
可持续发展
联锁
北京
公司治理
营销
企业社会责任
产业组织
公共关系
财务
工程类
中国
法学
电气工程
政治学
作者
Guangrui Liu,Qi Hao,Qianqian Wu,Fei Han
摘要
Abstract Based on impression management and principal‐agent theory, this article considers Chinese A‐share listed companies from 2014 to 2020 to explore whether vertical interlocking promotes the sustainable development of enterprises from the perspective of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) report greenwashing. The results show that vertical interlocking increases ESG report greenwashing and hides negative ESG information; these results remained valid through a series of robustness tests. Mechanism analysis shows that the purpose of ESG report greenwashing by vertically interlocked executives is to hollow out minority shareholders rather than to cover up earnings management to conceal actual ESG information. The vertical interlocking of executives more significantly promotes ESG report greenwashing when the property is state‐owned, has poor internal supervision mechanisms, has a large executive team and has no senior executives with green experience. This study furthers the relevant research on the factors affecting the sustainable development of enterprises and enriches and expands studies of the role of the vertical interlock from the perspective of information concealing, providing a more in‐depth reference for promoting the sustainable development of enterprises.
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