透视图(图形)
竞赛(生物学)
情感(语言学)
政府(语言学)
干预(咨询)
功率(物理)
博弈论
经济干预主义
业务
供应链
电池(电)
产业组织
微观经济学
经济
心理学
营销
计算机科学
政治学
政治
人工智能
法学
哲学
物理
精神科
生态学
生物
量子力学
沟通
语言学
标识
DOI:10.1093/ijlct/ctaf059
摘要
Abstract In this paper, I delve into two supply chains, each composed of one battery supplier and one new energy vehicle manufacturer. Considering government intervention, competition, and cooperation, I analyze six scenarios. It is found that vertical/horizontal cooperation benefits the power battery-recycling rate, while the deposit-subsidy policy has limited impact, so the government should raise the subsidy. When some firms cooperate while others do not, it benefits the cooperators and harms non-cooperators. Scenario C maximizes the supply chain’s overall profit, yet Scenarios CC or TC are not always best for firm profitability. Notably, social welfare peaks in Scenario TC.
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