自由化
公司治理
外商直接投资
货币经济学
中国
股票市场
全要素生产率
资本市场
代理成本
资本成本
业务
经济
金融体系
国际经济学
资本配置线
库存(枪支)
生产力
市场经济
股东
财务
宏观经济学
机械工程
古生物学
工程类
马
生物
政治学
法学
激励
作者
Zhisheng Li,Liu Chun,Xiaoran Ni,Jiaren Pang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.107053
摘要
Recent reform in China has made a subset of Chinese stocks available to foreign investors, partially opening up China's stock market. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that this liberalization reform boosts investments in investable firms relative to noninvestable ones, with results robust to various sensitivity analyses. Besides capital inflows and risk sharing, a potential but underexplored channel is improved corporate governance due to direct and indirect pressures from foreign investors, which lowers the cost of capital and improves capital allocation efficiency. Consistent with this corporate governance channel, we find that the liberalization reform reduces investable firms' agency costs, increases their investment efficiency and total factor productivity, and improves their operating performance. Further analysis finds that the positive investment effect from the liberalization reform is stronger among firms that were poorly governed before the reform.
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