自由裁量权
代理(哲学)
失业
可能性
官僚主义
民族
公共经济学
公共行政
政治学
人口经济学
业务
经济
经济增长
逻辑回归
政治
社会学
医学
社会科学
内科学
法学
作者
Mallory E. Compton,Marcus Young,Justin Bullock,Robert O. Greer
出处
期刊:Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
[Oxford University Press]
日期:2022-09-01
卷期号:33 (3): 512-528
被引量:2
标识
DOI:10.1093/jopart/muac036
摘要
Abstract Scholars have long recognized the role of race and ethnicity in shaping the development and design of policy institutions in the United States, including social welfare policy. Beyond influencing the design of policy institutions, administrative discretion can disadvantage marginalized clientele in policy implementation. Building on previous work on street-level bureaucracy, administrative discretion, and administrative burden, we offer a theory of racialized administrative errors and we examine whether automation mitigates the adverse administrative outcomes experienced by clientele of color. We build on recent work examining the role of technological and administrative complexity in shaping the incidence of administrative errors, and test our theory of racialized administrative errors with claim-level administrative data from 53 US unemployment insurance programs, from 2002 to 2018. Using logistic regression, we find evidence of systematic differences by claimant race and ethnicity in the odds of a state workforce agency making an error when processing unemployment insurance claims. Our analysis suggests that non-white claimants are more likely to be affected by agency errors that result in underpayment of benefits than white claimants. We also find that automated state–client interactions reduce the likelihood of administrative errors for all groups compared to face-to-face interactions, including black and Hispanic clientele, but some disparities persist.
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