公司治理
安全性令牌
业务
链条(单位)
功率(物理)
战略信息系统
软系统方法论
信息系统安全
会计
过程管理
计算机科学
信息系统
管理信息系统
计算机安全
工程类
财务
电气工程
物理
量子力学
天文
作者
Julie Saesen,Bastian Kindermann,Darius Abel,Steffen Strese
标识
DOI:10.1177/02683962251343627
摘要
Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) leverage blockchain technology to facilitate collaboration and decentralize decision-making through rules encoded in smart contracts. DAOs challenge traditional governance theory by combining ownership and management using governance tokens. A governance token’s performance is traceable based on token price changes and subject to influencing factors. Understanding these factors is essential to ensure DAOs’ long-term viability as a new organizational form. However, insights into the drivers of token performance are still limited, leaving both DAO founders and potential token holders in the dark about which on-chain governance design choices to adopt to attract potential token holders. We apply signaling theory to elucidate how on-chain governance design choices influence token performance and use a unique dataset of 204 DAOs. We find that a minimal token quorum positively relates to token performance, while embedding voting incentives, such as non-fungible tokens or additional governance tokens, can negatively relate to token performance. Moreover, we identify founders’ stake as a contingent factor moderating these signals.
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