Walking on thin ice: punishments as dynamics of policy mobilization in China

This study aims to explore the driving force of punitive measures in the large-scale policy mobilization in China. Previous studies tend to argue that rewarding or promoting officials who excel in completing political tasks encourages their participation in extensive mobilization. However, punishment and reward are just like two sides of the same coin. Ignoring punitive measures would be insufficient for understanding the dynamics of policy mobilization in China. For the vast majority of cadres in fact, frequent disciplinary actions are far more worrisome than scarce rewards. Through a combination of grounded theory and fs-QCA methods focused on numerous penalized cadres during the anti-epidemic policy mobilization, this study identifies five core conditions contributing to various punishments. It also uncovers the intricate interactions between top-down and bottom-up disciplinary actions, along with proactive and passive punitive measures. This study will illustrate how punitive measures shape the behaviour of cadres within China's bureaucratic system and also providing a thorough insight into how the CCP upholds its authority and ensures effective governance.