计算机科学
计算机安全
激励
可扩展性
互联网隐私
法律与经济学
经济
微观经济学
数据库
作者
Amit Biswas,Ravi Yadav,Gaurav Baranwal,Anil Kumar Tripathi
出处
期刊:IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers]
日期:2023-07-01
卷期号:16 (4): 2908-2922
标识
DOI:10.1109/tsc.2022.3231927
摘要
In blockchain-based systems, participants can be malicious. Therefore, this work first characterizes several properties expected in systems where the honest behaviour of involved parties plays significant role in the success. Considering these properties, a new consensus mechanism, Proof of Karma (PoK), is proposed based on karma (actions) of nodes. PoK incorporates a self-stabilizing leader election algorithm based on karma score to ensure consistency in the system. In PoK, both new and existing nodes get a fair chance to earn profit by becoming a leader and adding a valid block to the blockchain. PoK gives incentives and imposes penalties to encourage and discourage the nodes' honest and malicious actions. PoK is analyzed with respect to the CAP theorem. The work provides security analysis to demonstrate the resistance of PoK against various blockchain specific attacks and karma specific attacks. Several experiments are also performed to assess the performance of PoK and compare it with the baseline model. The results show the feasibility, effectiveness, usability and scalability of PoK. PoK is also compared based on the characterized properties with various existing consensus mechanisms that consider malicious actions of nodes. PoK achieves consensus finality, decentralization and fairness, outperforming existing works.
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