斯塔克伯格竞赛
供应链
对偶(语法数字)
利润(经济学)
频道(广播)
微观经济学
质量(理念)
渠道协调
业务
博弈论
一致性(知识库)
产业组织
战略优势
计算机科学
供应链管理
经济
营销
电信
艺术
哲学
人工智能
文学类
认识论
作者
Lizhao Yan,Xiulian Li,Kok Lay Teo,Fei Xu,Jian Liu
摘要
The difference between the actual product quality experienced by consumers after shopping and the product reference quality expected before shopping usually has a significant effect on product demand and brand reputation. This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. This investigation is on the influence of consumers’ reference quality under centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making Bertrand game, and decentralized decision-making Stackelberg game. Furthermore, in view of the influence of reference quality, this paper constructs cost-sharing contracts and two-part tariff contracts to discuss the consistency of the dual-channel supply chain. The results show that consumers’ reference quality effect has a positive impact on the equilibrium price and profit of the dual-channel supply chain. Under normal circumstances, the dual-channel supply chain cannot achieve conformity. However, consistency can be achieved under the two-part tariff contract mechanism. Finally, numerical simulation is carried out for verification with numerical values.
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