The Supreme Audit Institution in a country with a Napoleonic administrative tradition: Evolution or cosmetic change? Evidence from Italy

This study explores the impact of the 1994 reform on the Italian Supreme Audit Institution, which operates within a Napoleonic administrative tradition. Inspired by New Public Management principles, the reform is analysed through a historical lens to assess its effects on the Supreme Audit Institution's role. A thematic analysis of the Supreme Audit Institution's declarations, plans, and reports before and after the reform revealed that the changes were largely cosmetic. Utilising the theory of organised hypocrisy, this study finds that, while the Supreme Audit Institution outwardly embraced reform, its core operations remained aligned with its traditional role as a watchdog of public spending. This research contributes to the historical understanding of public sector reforms within contexts characterised by a strong legal code tradition and highlights the need for further exploration of the effectiveness of reforms in similar administrative settings.