Towards a metacognitive dual process theory of conditional reasoning

Abstract Dual-Process Theories (DPT) have emerged as the dominant theoretical framework for human reasoning and decision making. These theories commonly assume that reasoning and decision making are accomplished by the joint action of two types of processes: Automatic System 1 (S1) processes give rise to a highly contextualized representation of the problem and produce rapid, heuristic answers. System 2 (S2) implements more deliberate, decontextualized analytic processes. This chapter outlines a DPT of conditional reasoning. To do so, it attempts to answer the following questions based on current data: What is the nature of the S1 output? When and in what way does S2 intervene? How does this intervention produce the final answer? Where data are insufficient or contradictory, it suggests means of resolution. In the course of this analysis, it is argued that current formulations of DPT are fundamentally incomplete without a model of metacognitve processes.