自私
慷慨
最后通牒赛局
互惠(文化人类学)
社会心理学
独裁者赛局
心理学
社会困境
强互惠
亲社会行为
社会偏好
惩罚(心理学)
不公平厌恶
社会决策
公共物品
公共物品游戏
博弈论
微观经济学
重复博弈
经济
政治学
不平等
数学分析
法学
数学
作者
Paul C. Bogdan,Florin Dolcos,Matthew Moore,Ілля Павлович Кузнєцов,Steven Andrew Culpepper,Sanda Dolcos
摘要
Social expectations guide people's evaluations of others' behaviors, but the origins of these expectations remain unclear. It is traditionally thought that people's expectations depend on their past observations of others' behavior, and people harshly judge atypical behavior. Here, we considered that social expectations are also influenced by a drive for reciprocity, and people evaluate others' actions by reflecting on their own decisions. To compare these views, we performed four studies. Study 1 used an Ultimatum Game task where participants alternated Responder and Proposer roles. Modeling participants' expectations suggested they evaluated the fairness of received offers via comparisons to their own offers. Study 2 replicated these findings and showed that observing selfish behavior (lowball offers) only promoted acceptance of selfishness if observers started acting selfishly themselves. Study 3 generalized the findings, demonstrating that they also arise in the Public Goods Game, emerge cross-culturally, and apply to antisocial punishment whereby selfish players punish generosity. Finally, Study 4 introduced the Trust Game and showed that participants trusted players who reciprocated their behavior, even if it was selfish, as much as they trusted generous players. Overall, this research shows that social expectations and evaluations are rooted in drives for reciprocity. This carries theoretical implications, speaking to a parallel in the mechanisms driving both decision-making and social evaluations, along with practical importance for understanding and promoting cooperation.
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