商业道德
不当行为
业务
激励
合理化(经济学)
会计
代理成本
中国
公司财务
吓阻理论
新兴市场
知情人
资本市场
股票市场
公司治理
代理(哲学)
提交
财务
推定欺诈
经济
市场经济
股东
物理
核物理学
认识论
古生物学
微观经济学
生物
计算机科学
马
数据库
哲学
政治学
管理
法学
作者
Jiandong Chen,Douglas J. Cumming,Wenxuan Hou,Edward Lee
标识
DOI:10.1007/s10551-014-2393-3
摘要
We examine whether analyst coverage influences corporate fraud in China. The fraud triangle specifies three main factors, i.e. opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. On the one hand, analysts may reduce the fraud opportunity factor through external monitoring aimed at discouraging managerial misconduct, which can moderate agency problems. On the other hand, analysts may increase the fraud incentive factor by pressurizing managers to achieve short-term performance targets, which can exacerbate agency problem. In either case, the potential influence of analysts on the fraud rationalization factor may be more pronounced among firms that are more dependent on the capital market for corporate finance. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we show a negative association between corporate fraud propensity and analyst coverage, and that this effect is more pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises, which are more reliant on the stock market for external funding. These findings suggest that analyst coverage contributes to corporate fraud deterrence in emerging economies characterized by weak investor protection. The main policy implication is that further development of the analyst profession in emerging economies may benefit investors and strengthen business ethics.
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