分类
激励
生产力
变量(数学)
付款
经济
计件工作
收入
微观经济学
方案(数学)
变量
选择(遗传算法)
计量经济学
数学
统计
计算机科学
财务
数学分析
人工智能
宏观经济学
算法
作者
Thomas Dohmen,Armin Falk
标识
DOI:10.1257/aer.101.2.556
摘要
This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects face the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is a piece rate, a tournament, or a revenue-sharing scheme. We find that output is higher in the variable-payment schemes compared to the fixed-payment scheme. This difference is largely driven by productivity sorting. In addition, different incentive schemes systematically attract individuals with different attitudes, such as willingness to take risks and relative self-assessment as well as gender, which underlines the importance of multidimensional sorting. (JEL C91, D81, D82, J16, J31)
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