保护主义
官僚主义
自治
个人主义
遗赠
等级制度
市场调节
首都(建筑)
经济
政治经济学
政治学
经济体制
社会学
作者
Perri,Eva Heims,Martha Prevezer
摘要
As trade wars and protectionism again present severe challenges and obstructions to international economic regulatory organizations (IEROs), it is timely to ask how their predecessors survived the last deep deglobalization of the interwar years. This article presents a fresh neo-Durkheimian institutional explanation. It highlights contrasting pathways to survival and bequest of IEROs in three fields of regulation – international infrastructure, capital and labor, and commodities. Our explanation shows that functional imperatives and short-term market pressures in these different areas of regulation facilitated specific forms of social organization within IEROs (such as hierarchy or individualistic brokering). These contrasting forms of social organization cultivated distinct regulatory styles during deglobalization and cultivated capacities for contrasting survival and bequest strategies. Our approach is thus able to account for variation in pathways to survival in a way that other possible explanations, such as theories of regulatory capture or bureaucratic autonomy, cannot.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI