总统
管制国家
公共行政
合法化
公司治理
问责
违规
国家(计算机科学)
合法性
政治学
奖学金
民主
优势(遗传学)
民主治理
政治经济学
总统制
实验主义
控制(管理)
监管改革
法律与经济学
等级制度
制度化
政治
社会学
干预(咨询)
经济
官僚主义
出处
期刊:Governance
[Wiley]
日期:2026-04-01
卷期号:39 (2)
被引量:1
摘要
ABSTRACT This essay investigates the evolving relationship between Trumpism and the United States regulatory state, focusing on how Donald Trump has reshaped American administrative governance to one of personalist consolidation. Drawing on scholarship of the administrative presidency, I argue that Trumpism represents a strategic fusion of structural deregulation in sectors like environmental protection, energy, and finance with robust state intervention in domains tied to a right‐wing populist definition of national sovereignty. Trumpism reflects a personalist style of governance rooted in the exploitation of institutional tools of the administrative presidency that have developed across both Democratic and Republican administrations over the past century. By situating Trump within the broader institutional evolution of executive power, I highlight how his manipulation of the regulatory state entrenches executive dominance and preserves an illiberal reform in governance through electoral legitimation paired with the erosion of liberal‐democratic accountability standards in administration.
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