寡头垄断
经济
合资企业
微观经济学
利润(经济学)
结果(博弈论)
社会福利
激励
经济盈余
福利
数理经济学
古诺竞争
市场经济
商业
政治学
法学
作者
Yanfang Zhang,Zhong Tao
出处
期刊:Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
[American Institute of Mathematical Sciences]
日期:2024-01-01
卷期号:20 (2): 589-605
摘要
This note reconsiders equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture (RJV) of [13], allowing R&D outcome to be uncertain.In contrast to [13], we redefine the equilibrium and optimal size of an RJV.We assume that each firm can choose between independent R&D and cooperative R&D of participating in the RJV.At equilibrium no firm has an incentive to unilaterally change its decision of R&D modes.At the social optimum, the expected social welfare as the sum of the expected industry profit and the expected consumer surplus, is just maximized.We show that (i) strong spillovers drive more and more firms to conduct the risky R&D independently in equilibrium; (ii) the optimal size of an RJV does not necessarily coincide with the size of the oligopoly; (iii) the equilibrium size of an RJV is not always less than the optimal size; (iv) policy recommendations should take into account information spillovers and R&D risk.
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