社会情感选择理论
前景理论
结果(博弈论)
代理(哲学)
透视图(图形)
委托代理问题
高阶理论
业务
经济
微观经济学
营销
战略管理
心理学
公司治理
社会学
计算机科学
财务
人工智能
发展心理学
社会科学
作者
Robert E. Hoskisson,Francesco Chirico,J. Daniel Zyung,Eni Gambeta
标识
DOI:10.1177/0149206316671583
摘要
Managerial risk taking is a critical aspect of strategic management. To improve competitive advantage and performance, managers need to take risks, often in an uncertain environment. Formal economic assumptions of risk taking suggest that if the expected values for two strategies are similar but one is a greater gamble (uncertain), managers will choose the strategy with a more certain outcome. Based on these assumptions, agency theory assumes that top managers should be compensated or monitored to achieve better outcomes. We review the theory and research on agency theory and managerial risk taking along with theories that challenge this basic assumption about risk taking: the behavioral theory of the firm, prospect theory, the behavioral agency model and the related socioemotional wealth perspective, and upper echelons theory. We contribute to the literature by reviewing and suggesting research opportunities within and across these theories to develop a comprehensive research agenda on managerial risk taking.
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