比较静力学
公共物品
独特性
纳什均衡
经济
公共物品游戏
微观经济学
数理经济学
政治学
法学
作者
Kenichi Suzuki,Tatsuyoshi Miyakoshi,Jun‐ichi Itaya,Akitomo Yamanashi
摘要
Abstract This paper shows the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the presence of many heterogeneous players with two public goods under Cobb–Douglas preferences. It provides a sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium including contributors providing both public goods, and shows that contributors providing both public goods appear frequently. This uniqueness property allows us to conduct a comparative statics analysis with a contributor and a free rider of both public goods, showing the role of the contributor providing both public goods.
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