中国
业务
公司治理
突出
垄断竞争
国家所有制
衡平法
国有
代理成本
代理(哲学)
产业组织
会计
财务
股东
市场经济
经济
新兴市场
政治学
计算机科学
哲学
人工智能
认识论
法学
垄断
作者
Qi Wang,Ma Zhong,Xinyue Wang,Di Wu
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.frl.2023.104891
摘要
Utilizing Chinese mixed ownership reform that allows state-owned equity to participate in privately-owned enterprises (POEs), we find that ESG performance of POEs is enhanced with increased state shareholding. Mechanism tests demonstrate that state shareholding alleviates agency problems and financial constraints faced by POEs, thereby leading to enhanced ESG performance. Heterogeneity tests show that the positive impact is more salient among POEs with less aggressive business strategies, as well as those operating in monopolistic and lightly polluting industries. Additionally, by separating three individual components of ESG, we find that the positive impact is salient on social (S) and governance (G) performance.
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