THE SOCIOLOGIST AS PARTISAN: SOCIOLOGY AND THE WELFARE STATE

Sociology begins by disenchanting the world, and it proceeds by disenchanting itself. Having insisted upon the non-rationality of those whom it studies, sociology comes, at length, to confess its own captivity. But voluntary confessions should always be suspect. We should try to notice, when men complain about the bonds that enchain them, whether their tone is one of disappointed resentment or of comfortable accommodation. In 1961, in an address to a learned society, I attacked what I took to be dominant professional ideology of sociol ogists: that favoring the value-free doctrine of social science. Today, only six years later, I find myself in the uncom fortable position of drawing back from some who found my argument against the value-free myth so persuasive. I now find myself caught between two contradictory impulses: I do not wish to seem ungrateful toward those who sym pathized with my position, yet the issue is a serious one and I also do not want to encumber discussions of it with considerations of personal tact or professional courtesy. In a nutshell: I fear that the myth of a value-free social science is about to be supplanted by still another myth, and that the once glib acceptance of the value-free doctrine is about to be superseded by a new but no less glib rejection of it. My uneasiness concerning this came to a head upon reading Howard S. Becker's paper which boldly raises the problem, Whose Side Are We on? Rather than presenting the storybook picture of the sociologist as a value-free scien tist, Becker begins by stating that it is impossible for a social scientist to do research uncontaminated by personal and political sympathies. We are told that, no matter what perspective a sociologist takes, his work must be written either from the standpoint of subordinates or superiors. Ap parently one cannot do equal justice to both. The most telling indication of just how large a change sociology has recently undergone, may be seen not so much from the position that Becker takes but from the way his position is presented. There is nothing defensive in the manner that Becker rejects the older, non-partisan con ception of the sociologist's role. Instead, Becker presents his rejection of this position as if it needed no explanation; as if it were completely obvious to everyone; and as if there were nothing to argue about. His posture is not that of the cocky challenger but of a blas? referee announcing the out come of a finished fight, and whose verdict must be obvious. More than anything else, this suggests that there has been a substantial change in the occupational culture of sociol ogists in the last decade or so. Becker's conception of the partisan sociologist would be unimportant were it simply an expression of his own idio syncratic individuality. The fact is, however, that there is every reason to believe that he is voicing the sentiments of a substantial and probably growing number of sociologists, and, in particular, those whose interests focus upon the study of social problems, or the sociology of deviant be havior. It is notable that the article in which Becker asks, Whose Side Are We on?, was delivered originally as his