Joint optimization of e-commerce supply chain financing strategy and channel contract

斯塔克伯格竞赛 业务 财务 电子商务 收入 付款 供应链 营运资金 产业组织 经济 微观经济学 营销 计算机科学 万维网
作者
Shuhua Chang,Anqi Li,Xin Wang,Xinyu Wang
出处
期刊:European Journal of Operational Research [Elsevier BV]
卷期号:303 (2): 908-927 被引量:108
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2022.03.013
摘要

• We study the optimization of joint channel sales cooperation contract and financing strategy. • We explore the interaction between online retailer and e-commerce platform. • We introduce a mechanism in which creditors can exercise risk control through the Value at Risk constraint. • We characterize the impact of working capital level on strategy choice. • We prove the pricing principle of commission rate and usage fee of e-commerce platform. With the rise of the e-economy, online retailers, which are often financial-constrained, can choose to borrow from e-commerce platforms in addition to traditional financial institutions. Many e-commerce platforms adopt two types of market channel cooperation contracts: Reselling or Marketplace. We model their interaction as a Stackelberg game, studying the interaction between the financing strategies of the online retailers and the channel sales cooperation contracts of the e-commerce platforms. We observe the characteristics and applicable conditions in four modes. Results show that the working capital level of the online retailer will affect the preferences of both parties. Specifically, when working capital is low, platform direct financing has no advantage over bank financing. By contrast, a higher level will affect the operational decisions of the e-commerce platform, mainly due to the trade-off between sales revenue and interest income. Combined with the characteristics of online trading information collected by e-commerce platforms, we find that platform can provide a means of risk control to guarantee the benefits of both parties and solve the financing dilemma caused by low working capital. We further determine that the fixed commission rate of the platform should not be too large, otherwise the profits of the online retailer will be greatly weakened. This paper proves the necessity of the existence of transfer payment platform usage fee. Our findings not only complement the emerging online marketplace literature for e-commerce platforms but also provide enlightenment on working capital management for small and medium-sized enterprises and self-employed individuals such as online retailers.
最长约 10秒,即可获得该文献文件

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
怪物发布了新的文献求助10
刚刚
刚刚
刚刚
1秒前
上官若男的应助被fdaqin采纳,获得10
1秒前
红烧的鸽发布了新的文献求助10
1秒前
研友_Z33zkZ发布了新的文献求助10
1秒前
小拓跋完成签到,获得积分10
2秒前
早点毕业发布了新的文献求助10
2秒前
chenchen发布了新的文献求助10
2秒前
2秒前
3秒前
炙热萝完成签到,获得积分10
3秒前
包子完成签到,获得积分10
3秒前
Frederic发布了新的文献求助10
4秒前
科研通AI6.4的应助被shengjiaxinbg采纳,获得10
4秒前
花开富贵的应助被我又可以了采纳,获得30
5秒前
Ning_完成签到,获得积分10
5秒前
5秒前
5秒前
5秒前
6秒前
孟双完成签到,获得积分10
6秒前
Orange的应助被科研通管家采纳,获得10
6秒前
性感母蟑螂完成签到 ,获得积分10
6秒前
顾矜的应助被科研通管家采纳,获得10
6秒前
jodie的应助被科研通管家采纳,获得30
6秒前
tqdwxawa发布了新的文献求助10
6秒前
血癌乌鸦的应助被Kiki采纳,获得10
6秒前
乐空思的应助被科研通管家采纳,获得20
6秒前
lion完成签到,获得积分10
6秒前
6秒前
6秒前
6秒前
7秒前
领导范儿的应助被科研通管家采纳,获得10
7秒前
xin完成签到 ,获得积分10
7秒前
7秒前
王大石完成签到,获得积分10
7秒前
淡定苞络完成签到 ,获得积分10
8秒前
高分求助中
(应助此贴封号)【重要!!请各用户(尤其是新用户)详细阅读】【科研通的精品贴汇总】 10000
Energie-Contracting 1500
Klimaschutzrecht durch den Energiesektor im Mehrebenensystem – Ein Rechtsvergleich 1000
Représentation chimique de la structure des kérogènes et des asphaltènes en fonction de leur origine et de leur degré d'évolution 900
Ecotourism 400
Analytical Separation Science 300
Civilization and War 300
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 材料科学 医学 生物 纳米技术 计算机科学 工程类 有机化学 化学工程 生物化学 物理 复合材料 内科学 催化作用 光电子学 人工智能 细胞生物学 无机化学 物理化学 数学
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 8067529
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 9489445
关于积分的说明 21353188
捐赠科研通 7636299
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 3398161
关于科研通互助平台的介绍 2528098
邀请新用户注册赠送积分活动 2436033