调节器
质量(理念)
政治学
法律与经济学
业务
法学
经济
生物
哲学
认识论
遗传学
基因
作者
Matthew Kubic,Sara Toynbee
出处
期刊:Social Science Research Network
[Social Science Electronic Publishing]
日期:2021-01-01
摘要
High quality financial information depends on the effectiveness of regulators charged with ensuring compliance with financial reporting regulation. We use the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing review process as a setting to test whether individual regulators’ prior involvement (i.e., review team continuity) is associated with the quality of their decision-making. Although continuity may allow regulators to develop valuable knowledge to improve their decision-making, our results are more consistent with continuity leading to lower-quality reviews. Specifically, we find that review team continuity is associated with shorter reviews that ask fewer questions related to authoritative guidance or materially deficient areas, are more similar to the prior review, and are less likely to elicit an acknowledgement that the firm will change their filings. Our inferences are robust to using SEC staff turnover as an instrument for continuity. Overall, our results suggest new team members may provide a fresh perspective.
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